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I~ THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTL\H, ) 
) 
Plaintiff- ) 
Respondent, ) 
) Case No. 15550 
-vs- ) 
) 
JAEES M. GRAY, ) 
) 
Defendant- ) 
Appellant. ) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was a criminal action brought by the 
State of Utah against defendant-appellant James ?!. Cray 
charging him with burgularly, a felony in the second degree, 
in violation of the Section 76-6-202 Utah Code Annota.ted, 
1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITIO!I IN LOHim COURT 
In the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District, Uinta County, Utah on November 1, 1977 the jury 
found appellant guilty of burgulary as charged. Subsequently 
appellant was sent to the Utah Stilte Prison for a term of 
I 
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one to fifteen years as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing 
his conviction and quashing the information herein, or 
in the alternative, remanding the case to the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for a new trial consistent with the rulings 
of this Court. 
STATEME!n OF THE FACTS 
The evidence discloses that a burgularly 
occured on the 18th of September, 1977 in Uinta County, 
State of Utah, that the defendant was periodically in the 
company of the perpetrator of the burgularly and that tte 
defendant may have aided the principal in the perpetration 
or by selling one itEm obtained in the burgularly. Further, 
that the defendant was intoxicated during the day and 
evening in question. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL. 
In his opening statement defense counsel stated 
to the jury that he was"appointed"counsel for the defendant 
and thE.t he expected the evidence to show "That there 
will be no evidence that the defendant here, Mr. Gray, ever 
entered the premi.ses that was supposed to have alleged to 
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be burlarized" (T. 5). Counsel also stated that " ... we 
will introduce testimony from one of the parties that was 
supposed to have been charged in this same action that he 
didn't in fact--didn't commit the burgulary." (T.6) Appar-
ently defense counsel was totally iv,norant of the aiding 
and abetting statute (76-2-202 U.C.A. 1953 as amended) since 
defense counsel in his opening argument stated that" ... he 
might have dealt in some of the or handled some of the items 
as to the burgularly ... " (T.5) and in his motion at the 
close of the State's evidence moved to dismiss on the 
grounds that the defendant was not charged with having poss-
ession of property that was recently stolen and that the 
evidence failed to disclose any breaking and entering. 
As defense counsel stated in his motion "There might have 
been other crimes, but he is not charged with having posses-
sion of property that is recently stolen. I mean he is 
charged with the breakin:;; and entering." (T.56-57). 
In addition to revealing defendant's impec-
uniosity to the jury in his opening statement (T.S) counsel 
allowed witnesses to disclose to the jury that an agent from 
Adult Probation and Parole was involved in dealings with 
the defendant. See fer example (T.7,8,12 and 27-28). Not 
only was that disclosurE made but also the fact that the 
agent from Adult Probation and Parole had known defendant 
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for ten years (T.28) and that defendant had been incarcer-
ated in the Utah State Prison (T.54). All such disclosurEs 
were made without objection by counsel and without caution-
ary instructions to the jury. 
The record further discloses that tte trial 
counsEl failed to take even the rudimentary step of exclud-
ing the witnesses during the trial. See e.g. (T.22,28,40, 
46,62 and 70). 
Counsel further failed to properly investi-
gate the case as evidenced by the fact that he asked witness 
Ziegler how long he had known the defendant Gray and where 
he had met him, thereby eliciting otherwise inadmissible 
testimony most detrimental to his client. A reasonable 
investigation would have disclosed that defendant Gray was 
in prison at that time with the witness. This lack of 
investigation or sheer incompetency is further evidenced 
by defense counsel's failure to question witness Ziegler 
relative to any promises or inducements made by the pro-
secutor or any follow-up of Hr. Ziegler's prior felony 
conviction, notwithstanding that Ronald Ziegler was a crucial 
witness. 
The record is replete with hearsay statErnents 
and other objectionable evidence to Hhich defense counsel 
failed to make any objections or have stricken. Defense 
counsel did not request precautionary instruction~ appar-
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ently because he did not realize the evidence was object-
tionable. The cumulative effect of this failure to object 
and/or strike testirrony is further compounded by the fact 
that closing arguments were not recorded or included in 
the transcript, resulting, at best, in pure conjecture 
ES to the use made of objectionable evidence in closing 
arguments. 
This Court has reviewed numerous attempts to 
overturn convictions on the grounds trat the defendant was 
deprived effective assistance of counsel. For example, 
as recently as July 26, 1978 in State v. Pierren, Consol-
idated cases Ne. 14912, 15108, 15109, and 15114, the Court 
reiterated the long standing rule applicable to such cases: 
"to show inadequate or ineffEctive 
counsel, the record must establish that 
counsel was ignorant of the facts or the 
law, resulting in withdrawal of a crucial 
defense, reducing the trial to a "farce 
and a sham"." Citing State v. Mc.Nichol, 
554 P.2d 203 (Utah, 197 
That standard was further explained in State v. 
McNichol, supra, in which the Court stated: 
"he is entitled to the <issistence of 
a competant member of the Bar, who shows 
a willingness to identify himself with 
the interests of the accused and presents 
such defenses as are available under the 
law and consistent with the etf.ics of the 
professions." Id. at 204. 
Maturally, the defendant must be able to show 
that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was a 
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demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter. Fl.rtt.er, 
trial strategy must be differentiated from failures to 
investigate or effectively represent clients. As stated 
in People v. Martinez, 14 Cal.3d 533, 121 Cal.Rptr. 611, 
535 P.2d 739 (1975): 
"The cases involving a failure to 
make factual and lep,al inquiries and 
investigations necessary to a constitu-
tionally adequate defense are to be dis-
tinquinshed, of course, from cases 
wherein counsel, having made such in-
quiries and investigations makes tactical 
or strategic decisions ... 11 535 P. 2d at 
742. 
The record in this case clearly shows that 
drfense counsel was ignorant of both the facts and the 
law. Time after time hearsay, non-responsive answers, or 
evidence without foundation was admitted without objection 
and without motions to strike. Naturally enough not all 
hearsay statements or non-responsive answers are claimed 
to prejudicial, however, a review of the entire rEcord leads 
to the inescapable conclusion that due to defense counsel's 
inability to control the admission of hearsay and non-re-
sponsive testimony, defendant Gray was deprived a fair 
trial. For example, Officer Downer testified as to Hr. 
Stanley's identification of certain items of evidence (T. 
11,12, 13 and 14), statements made by Mr. Butters with re-
spect to l~. Gray (T.14) and the hardship that the victim 
underwent (T.13). Defense counsel further compounded the 
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error with the first witness when he elicited testimony 
from Officer Downer that Mr. Butters stated that both 
Butters and Gray had been behind thE wheel of the pickup 
truck the night in question (T.19). 
Defense counsel followed the same pattern 
with the second witness, Officer Lance. During that 
testimony defense counsel elicited several damaging non-
responsive answers concerning defendant's association with 
witness Butter's without seeking the Court's assistance 
in having the witness respond to the question or having 
the answers stricken. See (T.26). Defense counsel also 
permitted substantial testimony concerning a search which 
was totally irrelevant to the case inasmuch as none of 
the items obtained in the search were offered as evidence, 
See (T.29). 
The list could go on and on with respect 
to the subsequent witnesses and counsel's failure to object 
to hearsay, non-responsive answers or lack of foundation. 
See for example (T.53). 
Counsel's further failure tc understand the 
law of aiding and abetting is made abundantly clear in his 
motion to dismiss (T.56-58) and in his opening statement 
(T.5). Although the jury was instructed on the law of 
aiding and abetting, counsel apparently believed that the 
lack of entry by his client was valid defense. 
-7- ... 
L e -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defense counsel was further remiss by failing 
to exclude witnesses, a must n:.dimentary tactical decision, 
that evinces more a lack of awareness than an informed trial 
decision. 
The record exudes defense counsel's inability 
to control the trial procedure or to confine jt to the 
most rudimentary parameters of the Rules of Evidence thereby 
depriving him of any opportunity to reasonable assert defen-
dants lack of knowledge concerning the stolen items, lack 
of intent to aid or abet,or that an altern<,tive reasonable 
hypothesis existed in explanation of the defendant's actions. 
This trial was in fact, "a farce and a sham" and devoid of 
"these careful, factual and legal inquiries and investiga-
tions necessary to a constitutionally adequate defense." 
People v. Martinez, supra, at 742. Careful legal inquiry 
would have indicated to defense counsel any possible com-
plicity as an aider and abetter as any factual inquiry would 
have disclosed to counsel that Ronald Ziegler had known the 
defendant-appellant while they were in prison. Instead, 
the trial record evinces questioning by defense counsel 
more analogous and attuned to preliminary hearings tt.an 
trials. As a trial it was a farce and a sham. 
II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW 
DEFENDANTS PRIOR CONVICTION, PRISON SENTENCE AND RELATION_ 
SHIP TO ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE CONSTITUTES PREJUDICIAL 
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ERROR. 
During the State's case in chief references 
to defendant's prior conviction(s) and prison sentence there-
on were alluded to in direct examination or cross-examination 
of State witnesses (T.54). The jury also was informed that 
an Adult Probation and Parole agent had known defendant for 
ten years, (T.27-28) and that the agent was involved in 
the investigation (T.8, 12). 
Pursuant to statute, e.g. 78-24-9 U.C.A. (1953 
as amended), and case law a defendant and witness may be 
asked whether or not he has ever been convicted of a felony. 
Such is a proper scope of inquiry into a testifying person's 
credibility. See for example State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 
206 P. 717 and State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 
(1961). 
Notwithstanding the general principal as to 
testifying witnesses, when information is elicited from 
witnesses tending to show that the defendant has a propen-
sity to commit crimes or to degrade the defendant, such is 
prejudicial error unless the appellate court can conclude 
that a different result would not have been obtained. 
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 
(1963) the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning a con-
versation the defendant had with an FBI agent in which the 
agent implicated the defendant in other crimes for which 
the defendant had not been convicted. The Court held such 
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constituted prejudicial error, holding as follows: 
"We deem the foregoing to consti-
tute prejudicial error. It inplied 
that the defendant was imolicated in 
other crimes,none of them.proven, and 
could have no other effect than to 
degrade the defendant and give the 
jury the impression that he had a 
propensity for crime." 382 P.2d at 409. 
Similarly, allegations of crimes subsequent 
to the alleged crime for which the defendant is being 
tried, absent admissibility under Rule 55, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, constitute prejudicial error. See State v. 
Dickson, 12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 417 (1961), in wbich the 
Court reiterated the well established standard for review: 
"Inasmuch as we cannot say with 
any degree of assurance that there 
would not have been a different result 
in the absence of the error ... it must 
be regarded as prejudicial and the case 
remanded for a new trial." 361 P.2d at 415. 
Not all references to other crimes, other than 
admission under Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, are 
per se prejudicial. In State v. Hodges, 30 U.2d 367, 517 
P.2d 1322 (1974) this Court held that where the trial judge 
sustains objections to such evidence, instructs the jury 
to disregard such evidence and minimizes tr.e impact of the 
entire matter, a jury could be trusted to follow the trial 
court's instructions. 
The record of defendant Gray's trial reflects 
no objection to evidence of prior misdeeds, convictions or 
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parole and does not reflect that the evidence was stricken. 
The jury was allowed to consider all the evidence without 
cautionary instructions. It is abundantly plain that such 
evidence had no probative value whatsoever. The only 
possible effect was one of degradation and indications of 
criminal propensity. Coupled with the dearth of direct 
and clear-cut evidence linking defendant to the crime the 
jury could easily have relied on the defendant's criminal 
history to adjudge him guilty. Not only was there a re&son-
able likekihood that the trial would have had a different 
result,in fact, the record reflects a strongly compelling 
likelihood of acquittal. 
COil CL US ION 
Appellant submits that the foregoing errors, 
each sufficient to justify reversal, combined to deprive 
him of a fair trial and due process of law. This Court 
should reverse and remand for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted. 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I delivered Z---copies 
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to the Office of the Attorney General, State Capital 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah this 18th day of September, 
1978. 
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